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BETWEEN THE RIVER AND THE FLOOD:
THE CHEROKEE NATION AND THE BATTLE FOR
EUROPEAN SUPREMACY IN NORTH AMERICA
ABSTRACT
This thesis examines the role of the Cherokee Indian nation in the Seven Years' War.
This conflict was both the final act o f the wrenching conflicts over colonial mastery o f the
North American continent by European powers and thej>relude to the American
Revolution. It also examines how the cultural differences that this war exposed between
the whites and Indians culminated in the Cherokee War of 1760, an event that changed the
Cherokees from British allies to enemies and broke the tribe's power on the continent.
Much like the French they helped to defeat, the Cherokees were, ironically, also removed
as a major continental force by the Seven Years' War.
Colonial governments understood that southern Indians, most notably the Cherokees,
served two vital functions. First, they were o f great strategic importance. The Cherokees
held the option o f working with the British or opening up a second front against them.
The latter move would have stretched British forces thin and, while certainly not
impossible, would have made the British victory more costly in both resources and lives.
Second, the Cherokees were valued as both scouts and soldiers, because white colonists
were unwilling or unable to fight in the so-called "Indian way," a way shown effective by
the tragic demise o f Edward Braddock's expedition against the French and their Indian
allies in 1755.
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This thesis argues that the Cherokees were a vital part of the British victory in the Seven
Years' War and that their contribution deserves a vital place in the history of the conflict.

BETWEEN THE RIVER AND THE FLOOD
THE CHEROKEE NATION AND THE BATTLE FOR
EUROPEAN SUPREMACY IN NORTH AMERICA

INTRODUCTION
The Cherokee nation of the mid-1770s was a mere shadow o f the powerful ally the
British had so diligently courted before and during the Seven Years’ War. The Cherokees
emerged from the conflict ripped apart by internal bickering and chastened by ancient
Indian enemies. Cherokee elders like Attakullakulla, a headman of considerable
importance and influence, were discredited among their own people as a result o f the
aftermath of the war. The warriors of the younger generation were left with a bitter taste
o f defeat in their mouth and a gnawing frustration at the plight o f their nation. Colonial
officials, the same men who had been so effusive in their praise only a few years before,
were now stepping up to relieve the Cherokees of their ancestral land and ancient
traditions as conditions for allowing them to live in peace. The Indians had made a terrific
miscalculation when they agreed to support the British against the French. Cherokee
leaders had believed that the British* with their help, would eventually toss the French
from the continent. These same British would then, of course, reward their Indian allies
and brutally punish the Indian nations who had aligned themselves with the French. As
Attakullakulla surveyed his land in 1761, he must have wondered what had gone wrong.
Attakullakulla had been an ardent supporter of the British cause against the French in
North America. With diplomatic aplomb and considerable skill, he had reasoned that the
interests of his nation lay in assisting the local English colonists and their mother country.
He had led Cherokee warriors into battle for this reason. He had stood at the head of
delegations who sought to secure the best economic and military deals possible for his
nation. He had been at the forefront during a period when Indian affairs were considered
matters o f foreign policy, not a domestic nuisance. The Cherokees then had been
considered a powerful force in North America and essential to British victory in the
southern colonies. But those times were gone.
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In 1766 John Stuart, the superintendent o f Indian affairs for the southern half o f the
British colonies, had written to his northern counterpart, Sir William Johnson, to inform
him that the Cherokees were "much reduced, and at this time do not exceed two thirds the
Number they consisted o f about ten Years ago.1,1 Stuart said that the Cherokees had been
decimated by a war with the British and the ensuing attacks of their ancient rival, the
Iroquois. The Cherokees, who only a few years earlier had entertained emissaries who
sought their cooperation and loyalty, were reduced to flooding the halls o f Parliament and
colonial governments with desperate requests for a mediated peace. These battles with
the Iroquois, coupled with a crippling smallpox epidemic in 1759-60, had caused the
Cherokees to dwindle from twenty-two thousand early in the century to about twelve
thousand in 1775.2 In addition, they Jaad lost thousands of acres o f crops and fifteen of
their towns to British and American troops in 1760.3 The decline in numbers led to a
decline in power and stature, which in turn had a devastating effect on Cherokee morale.
Cherokee society soon began to groan under the weight of these circumstances.
Ancient traditions were soon cast aside and replaced with the frustration and anger o f
youth. As the continent prepared for yet another war, this one a so-called revolution
against colonial authority and declaring the rights o f man, Attakullakulla and other elders
urged caution. They knew all too well the deadly possibilities o f getting embroiled in one
of the white man's wars. Under normal circumstances, the admonitions of these proven
leaders and elder statesmen of the tribe would have been weighed carefully and, with few

1Theda Perdue, "Cherokee Relations with the Iroquois in the Eighteenth Century," in
Beyond the Covenant Chain: The Iroquois and Their Neighbors in Indian North
America, 1600-1800, eds. Daniel K. Richter and James H. Merrell (Syracuse.
Syracuse University Press, 1987), 144.
2Colin Calloway, The American Revolution in Indian Country: Crisis and Diversity
in Native American Communities (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995),
182.
3Perdue, "Cherokee Relations with the Iroquois," 143.
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exceptions, heeded. But the young men were in no mood to listen to these men, whom
many probably held responsible for their present difficulties.
The warriors, including Attakullakulla's son Dragging Canoe, rejected the advice
outright and agreed to band with northern warriors against the Americans. This may be
attributed in part to the half-hearted pleas made by Attakullakulla and his peers. "Instead
of opposing the rashness o f the young people with spirit," John Stuart said, the leaders
merely "sat down dejected and silent."4 Perhaps they still harbored dreams of a return to
their former glory, or perhaps they recognized the determination o f their young men.
Either way, the elders made it known, however timidly, that they did not feel it in their
people's best interest to get involved in this war and their opinions were shoved aside.
Colin Calloway has written that Cherokee tradition held that "young men were
expected to be aggressive in certain circumstances and old men to be rational; Cherokee
society accommodated and harmonized the resulting tensions. However, in the
Revolution the tensions became incompatible."5 But it was not the Revolution alone that
gave rise to these tensions. The Americans' war for independence only brought this
conflict to the surface. The tremendous gap that had developed between the wise counsel
o f the elders and the angry impetuosity o f the warriors can more accurately be traced back
to the Seven Years' War and its tragic outcome for the Cherokees.
When the British came into their nation in 1756 to ask for their support, they had given
it. Traveling and fighting miles from their ancestral homelands, Cherokee warriors had
distinguished themselves as scouts and as soldiers. When the tide o f war had turned in
favor of their British allies, they had expected to be a party to the spoils o f victory. In
1760, even as foreboding news o f clashes between settlers and Cherokee veterans poured
in from the frontier, men like Attakullakulla had reason to believe that they would share in

4Calloway, American Revolution, 195.
5Ibid, 196-97.

5

the fruits of victory. They counseled caution against reprisals for the occasional violence
against their veterans returning from the north. They were British allies, after all.
But Attakullakulla failed to recognize one essential fact. Once the French were
removed as a colonial power, the Indians themselves became an impediment to complete
English dominion over North America. This dominion had been the war's true aim from
the very first shot. The Seven Years' War quickly led to the Cherokee War o f 1760, a
thoughtless conflict caused as much by ignorance as a failure of diplomacy. From the
moment Cherokee warriors retaliated for the death or humiliation of their own, the might
of the British carnet crashing down. Their villages and crops were put to the torch and
their land seized indiscriminately. The Cherokee leadership was forced to make peace as
soon as possible and at any cost.
The price was a drastic weakening o f their society. The first step integrated the
nation's warriors into the Cherokee political process. This step was designed to weaken
the old clan ties and the ancient laws o f retaliation, both essential and sacred traditions.
The second step was a series of treaties which were little more than land cessions. One
such treaty traded 27,000 square miles of land for a cabin loaded with trade goods. The
land ceded separated the Cherokees from ancestral hunting grounds between the Ohio
River and Kentucky.6 These decisions irreparably divided the Cherokee people, which
contributed to tribal divisions during the American Revolution.
It would be too dramatic to say that the Seven Years' War was the beginning of the
end for the Cherokees, but it was a watershed. Their role in the war taught them two
facts of their new world. First, their white neighbors were not to be trusted. Second,
these same folks would have to be placated wherever and whenever possible. In 1756 the
Cherokees had believed that their role in the war would assure them a peaceful and
prosperous coexistence with the English and the Americans. By 1761 they were, like their

6Ibid, 188-90.
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avowed enemies the French, reeling from the wrath of British arms. Although there were
major factors working against them, it was not inevitable that the Cherokee-British
alliance would collapse. To discover how this came about, one must examine the cultural
differences that the Seven Years' War exposed and the tragic responses o f both sides.

I. "ON THEM MIJCH DEPENDS"
It did not take long for the news to reach George Washington, colonel of the Virginia
regiment. He had been expecting it for some time, but that did not make its arrival any
less alarming. He had made his camp in Winchester in order to acclimate himself to his
new responsibilities. H e had assumed command o f the forces on September 1, 1755, and
his instructions were clear: "drive the French from the Ohio."1
His promotion to cpmmander o f the force massing against the French gave him little
comfort. He had taken command as a result o f the sudden and unexpected loss o f the
previous commander, Major General Edward Braddock. Braddock's defeat and death in
the field in early July 1755 had left a vacancy, and Governor Robert Dinwiddie o f Virginia
had decided that Braddock's subordinate should assume the position o f leadership. It was
part o f an incredible comeback for this young Virginian, who earlier had resigned from his
regiment rather than be demoted for his leadership o f a disastrous expedition against the
enemy. Near the end o f August, Dinwiddie fired off a commission, instructions, and
memorandum to his new commander.2
Given the wartime circumstances, the news was simple and not really unusual: an
English settlement had been attacked by the enemy. What made this news troubling and
what got Washington's attention was that the enemy in this case was not the French but
the Indians who had attacked the settlement and were terrorizing the British in the Ohio
Valley. Such a report was not entirely unexpected. The British had known for some time
that the French were working tirelessly to bring the powerful Indian nations of the Ohio
Valley and their neighbors into the French camp. French traders had been dealing with

1The Papers o f George Washington, Colonial Series, ed. W.W. Abbot, 10 vols.
(Charlottesville: University o f Virginia Press, 1983), 2: 4
2PGW- 2: 1.
7
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these Indians for years and they were currently soliciting all the support they could with
denunciations, promises, and presents. Washington and the British had hoped that the
French were meeting with the same stonewalling that had met their own overtures.
Governor Dinwiddie had complained in a letter to Washington that the Cherokees were
"very tedious in th^ir Consultations."3 News o f this Indian raid, however, made it clear to
the young colonel that the French had been more successful at making inroads with the
Indians than had the British.
The British understood from the outset that their success or failure in the campaign
was, at least in part, dependent on their ability to convince the Indians o f the legitimacy of
their cause. Washington had been especially adamant about the need for native allies. He
kept pressure on Dinwiddie to do everything in his power to match the gifts o f the French
and to procure the services of the Indians. On April 7,1756, Washington wrote to the
governor to assure him that "it is in their [the Indians'} power to be of infinite use to us. "4
Moreover, he flatly stated that "without Indians, we shall never be able to cope with those
cruel Foes to our Country."5 His ardent belief in the need for Indian assistance was
probably bom out of his experience in July 1755, when he watched his mission with
Braddock end tragically. In that encounter, Washington saw a force made up o f nearly
two-thirds Indians and only one-third French regulars thrash the British and send them
retreating into the woods.6 Despite promises from the government in Williamsburg,
Indian scouts and warriors had not materialized that summer, and Washington had seen
first hand the effect that had on his predecessor. Trained British regulars had panicked at
the sight o f the Indians and their style o f fighting and the lessons were clear. Without
Indians o f their owp to counteract this problem, the British would be in serious trouble.
3PGW 2: 356, (April 15, 1756)
4PGW 2: 334, (April 7, 1756)
5PGW 2: 334.
6John Richard Alden, Robert Dinwiddie, Servant o f the Crown (Williamsburg: Colonial
Williamsburg Foundation, 1973), 54.

9

Washington so Relieved in the need for Indians that the normally respectful young
officer even ventured to give the governor some political advice. His convictions, he
wrote "would notjsuffer me to be quite Silent" about the less-than-stellar performance of
the traders and interpreters contracted by the British to treat with the Indians.7
Washington assured Dinwiddie that it was only his "Zeal to the cause" that led him to
overstep his bounds in such a way.8 Washington cautioned that the traders were
themselves making a fortune passing off backwoodsmen and hunters as Cherokee leaders
and "princes." His concern was that gifts that had been gathered for distribution to the
loyal Cherokees would be wasted through such fraud, and he counseled Dinwiddie to
place a trustworthy man in charge o f these vital activities. George Washington
understood from experience that the Indians were temperamental and he wanted every
care taken to see that they were not somehow offended or alienated by the profiteering of
"blood thirsty Villain's/9
Despite his early disclaimer that he was overstepping his bounds, Washington was
explicit in what he expected from Dinwiddie. Although the tone of his Letter dated
October 17, 1755 is diplomatic and respectful, it is abundantly clear that Washington did
not want to take the field without Indian allies. He cautioned that French efforts to sway
the affections o f the southern Indians should not be taken lightly. "I must look upon it as
a thing of the utmost consequence, that requires our greatest and most immediate
attention," he wrote from his headquarters.10 Other correspondence between Winchester
and Williamsburg in late 1755 and early 1756 decried the lack o f supplies, the shortage o f
funds, and the resulting desertion o f troops. Even with these conditions fingering over
every military plan Washington and his advisors devised, he told Dinwiddie that no

7PGW 2-120 (Oct. 17, 1755),
8PGW 2 1 2 0
9PGW] 2-120
10PGW. 2: 120.
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expense should be spared if a man could be found that had the trust and respect of the
southern Indians.
Washington's insistence on gathering Indians for his campaigns does not seem to have
arisen out o f any fear of facing French troops on the battlefield. From his letters it appears
that his true fear was leading his Virginia militia against Indian opponents. In April 1756
he wrote that the Indians' "cunning and craft are not to be equalled; neither their activity
and indefatigable sufferings: they prowl about like Wolves; and like them.do their
mischief by Stealth."11 Washington also understood that Indians fighting with the British
would be Indians not fighting against the British. Far more than just a numerical or a
logistical consideration for the Virginian, it was a question o f insuring that his men would
be fighting an enemy they could train for, rather than an enemy who fought in a novel
style. The "cunning and craft" o f Indian warriors, coupled with their "stealth," was not
something Washington felt prepared to confront. Let the French worry about what was
lurking behind the trees of the Ohio Valley; the British did not need the distraction.
"Without Indians to face Indians," lie said in 1756, "we may expect but small success."12
Dinwiddie did not need convincing when it came to recruiting Indians for the crown.
He was, however, faced with problems unknown to Washington that may have been
difficult for the military man to understand. Dinwiddie's primary difficulties were political.
As early as 1754, he had been working to insure the allegiance o f the southern Indians and
he had fully expected a force of them to accompany Braddock on the first march to Fort
Duquesne. H e had written to the Lords o f Trade in October 1754 to assure them that his
"Views and Inclinations have always been sanguine in cultivating a Friendship with the
different Nations o f Indians in Amity with Brittain and these colonies, particularly with the
Southern Indians, the Catawbas and Cherokees."13 In the fall o f that year Dinwiddie

n PGW 2: 333.
12 PGW, 3: 45, April 24, 1756.
The O fficial Records o f Robert Dinwiddie, Lieutenant-Governor o f thejColony o f
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began to actively recruit the southern tribes. He sent messengers to inform them that the
French had invaded Cherokee and Catawba hunting grounds and that he sought their
assistance in removing the invaders. At the same time his personal battle with Governor
James Glen o f South Carolina began.
In another letter that Dinwiddie mailed in October 1754, he had some harsh words
about Glen for the Earl o f Halifax, The Virginian said that Gien sounded more like a
"French commander... than... an English Governor."14 These were harsh words when one
remembers that the British were on the verge o f total war with the French empire.
Dinwiddie was not totally unaccustomed to being unpopular with fellow colonial officials;
in fact, he had faced the same situation in Bermuda with Governor John Bruce Hope.
Dinwiddie had been named Receiver General and Solicitor and Comptroller of the
Admirality on the Island and used this position to dabble in areas that Hope believed were
none of his business. At one point, Hope accused Dinwiddie o f stealing from the colony,
an accusation that was never proven. But Dinwiddle's charm and diligence would turn
him into "an intimate friend" o f Hope by 1725.15 James Glen would prove to be a more
daunting challenge.
As far as Glen was concerned, the Cherokee and Catawba Indian nations were his
responsibility, not Dinwiddie's. He enjoyed seniority over all his fellow governors, having
been appointed to the South Carolina post in 173 8. His tenure, in fact, was the longest o f
any colonial governor.16 Much like Governor Hope, Glen resented what he saw as
Dinwiddie's meddlmg in his territory. Glen did not appreciate that he had been virtually
ignored by Dinwiddie in the Virginian's April 19, 1754 message to the Cherokee nation,

Virginia, 1757-1758, ed. R.A. Brock, 2 vols. (Richmond: Virginia Historical Society,
1883). 1: 364.
14RRD j 1: 368 .
15Alden, Robert Dinwiddie, 7.
16W. Stitt Robinson, James Glen: From Scottish Provost to Royal Governor o f South
Carolina (Westport, Conn: Greenwood Press, 1996), ix.
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asking the Indians for their assistance in expelling the French from the Ohio Valley.
Dinwiddie informed his friend James Abercrombe that Glen "writes me in a very dictatorial
style and seems to find fault with my conduct." The South Carolina governor bluntly told
Dinwiddie "not to interfere with Catawbas and Cherokees, who are under the protection
of [my] colony" which, according to Dinwiddie, "refuses any supplies."17 Dinwiddie
understood that he could not bypass the cranky Scot, but he was having no luck
negotiating with him.
The summer months o f 1754 offered no relief for Dinwiddie. Glen was finally able to
get the green light fpr a projected fort among the Overhill communities of the Cherokee
nation from the Board of Trade and Secretary of State for the Southern Department o f the
colonies. Although this fort had been Glen's own brainchild, he expected the Virginians to
contribute to the cost, arguing that they would also benefit from the construction. When
Dinwiddie requested an estimate of the costs, Glen unabashedly sent him the elaborate
plans along with a price tag of seven thousand pounds. He explained that he felt the fort
should be more than "a few Palisadoes or Puncheons put together,"18 Dinwiddie bristled
at the cost and offered Glen one thousand pounds, a fraction of what Glen felt he was due.
The Virginia governor's action sent Glen into the factional strife o f his own assembly,
where he was able to procure only an additional two thousand pounds. The elaborate fort
in Overhill country was financially doomed.19
General Braddock's campaign in the summer o f 1755 would intensify the conflict
between the two gpvemors. When 1755 opened, Dinwiddie was confident about the
possibility of the southern tribes sending some of their warriors into battle beside British
regulars and colonial militia. In January he had written his friend Arthur Dobbs, the

17RRD, 1: 375 (Oct. 27, 1754),
18RRD 1: 103.
19RRD, 1:103.
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governor of North Parolina, that "I doubt not but many of the Indians will join us.”20
After all, the preceding spring Dinwiddie had written Lord Holdemesse to inform him that
the Cherokees and Catawbas had promised one thousand men should the French invade
their hunting grounds.21 Dinwiddie also told Dobbs that no military action would be
undertaken until Braddock and his men arrived from Ireland, which left enough time to
negotiate a lasting peace with the Cherokees and the Catawbas.
By the time Braddock was ready to begin his march, Dinwiddie was virtually certain
that the southern Indians were in his favor. Both the powerful Cherokee and Catawba
nations were still promising aid to the British cause, and Dinwiddie had good reason to
expect that they would join Braddock's force along the way. But Indian assistance never
materialized and the reason for this infuriated Dinwiddie and drove a permanent wedge
between Glen and himself. Barely three weeks after learning o f the disastrous defeat o f
the British at Fort Puquesne, Dinwiddie told Dobbs that Glen "had a meeting with those
two Nations o f Indians at the very time they should have jo in ed our forces." Dinwiddie
went on to say that, had this clandestine meeting not taken place, "we should not in all
probability have been defeated, as they {the Indiansj would have attacked the Indians in
their Bush way of fighting, which the Regulars are strangers to."22 In Dinwiddie's view,
Glen had now progressed from a difficult man to a traitor. He blamed Glen for the death
o f Braddock and the entire fiasco, showing that he, too, believed that Indian participation
was crucial to ensure a British victory. Glen had kept the southern Indians at home at the
very moment when the British needed them, for which Dinwiddie would never forgive
him.
But Braddock's expedition was felled by more than the untimely treaty negotiations of
one man. Arthur Dobbs joined Dinwiddie in criticizing Glen for the fiasco, but neither

20RRD, 1: 469.
21RRD 1 94.
22RRD 2-123

14

man was unbiased. In fact, their complicity in the matter is more unseemly than Glen's
efforts at a treaty. Both Dobbs and Dinwiddie were members o f the Ohio Land Company
and therefore had a vestedinterest in expelling the French and their Indian allies from the
region as quickly as possible.23 Whether this caused them to send Braddock rushing in,
without waiting for Glen's negotiations to end, can only be a matter of speculation. For
his part, Braddock Warned "the folly of Mr. Dinwiddie and the roguery of the assembly"
for his lack of Indians.24 Angrily, he asked why Dinwiddie had not done a better job
coordinating with the Carolinas since, as he phrased it, they were "natural allies."25
Dinwiddie also undoubtedly saw political and military ramifications in Glen's
negotiations. At the very time he was trying to convince the southern Indians that the
French meant to enslave all of America's Indians and could be expected to steal their
lands, Governor Glen, representing the British crown and cause, was convincing the
Cherokees to sell off a large tract o f their land. In a letter to Dobbs in September 1755,
Dinwiddie argued that "the French will make a proper use of it [the selling of the land], by
observing that we make Purchases o f their lands to enslave their whole People".26 Here
was Robert Dinwiddie, firing off letter after letter to his military commanders instructing
them not to do anything that would offend the Indians, facing the embarrassing problem
that one of his peers had committed the ultimate insult to the powerful Cherokees.
Dinwiddie condemned Glen in strong language, but all he could really do was hope that
the damage done by the southern leader could be overcome.
There were more obstacles to be overcome than just bickering bureaucrats. Other
characters threatened to stand in the way o f securing Indian loyalty to the British. Adam
Stephen, a fellow colonel in the British cause, wrote to Washington at Winchester to let

23Robinson, James Glen, 102.
24Ibid, 102.
25Ibid, 102.
26RRD 2. 203.
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him know that he seconded the opinion that any price should be paid to insure the loyalty
o f the southern Indians. He also believed that as long as this task was in the hands o f the
traders, no favorably outcome could be expected. He comforted Washington, saying that
he, too, wanted to see a man of "weight and Integrity" placed in charge o f Indian affairs.27
The use of Indians was, he said, o f the utmost importance to the survival of the colonies.
The Delawares and Shawnees had already been lost to the French and they were paying
dividends to the enemy. Rendezvousing at the Delaware town o f Kittanning, Indian
warriors from these tribes had easy access to settlers in Pennsylvania and Virginia. Like
Washington, Stephen understood that the loss o f the southern tribes would leave British
armies and colonial militia in the unenviable position of trying to contain this type of
raiding on two fronts. With the militia in such disarray, it was clear to British colonial
leaders that constant harassment from the Cherokees or Catawbas could easily turn the
tide o f the war.
Dinwiddie agreed with Stephen that having Indian relations in the hands o f the traders
was not in the best interests o f the colonies. He had learned the hard way that traders
could be more of a hindrance than an asset. Dinwiddie believed that it was the personal
feud between two traders, Richard Pearis and Christopher Gist, that had enabled James
Glen to keep the Cherokees and Catawbas from Braddock's side. In a letter dated June
26, 1755, Dinwiddie scolded Pearis for allowing "Quarrels and Disputes between private
Persons" to stand in the way o f "Public Service."28 Only later would the governor realize
the significance of this episode and it would convince him of the need for reliable, honest
men to be sent into Indian country. When Braddock's unit had faced the French and their
Indians, fighting in the Indian way, they had been pummeled. Dinwiddie could not afford
for that to happen again.

27PGW: 2: 159 (Nov. 7, 1755).
28RRD, 2: 77.
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More than just a fear o f an Indian enemy was involved in the recruitment of native
support for the English. Colonial officers needed the Indians for their skills. Dinwiddie
wasted no time in advising Washington on how his troops should be trained. The defeat
o f Braddock had been a major setback for the British cause and the governor did not want
to see Washington meet the same fate. For Dinwiddie, it was imperative that the militia be
trained in methods that could defeat French regulars, which meant fighting like Indians. "I
hope the men are duly exercised & taught the Indian M ethod o f fighting,11he wrote
Washington in December 1755, "that they may be prepared for action in the Spring."29
Christopher Gist had written to Washington from Opechan earlier in the year, where he
was recruiting Pennsylvanians for the war. His letter shows that, despite the animosity
which existed between Indians and whites in the area, the settlers had been forced by
experience to acknowledge their Indian neighbors as skilled warriors. In fact, Gist
informed Washington, the potential recruits all talked about taking the field and fighting
"in the Indian w ay/'30 It must have been a blow to professional soldiers such as General
John Forbes to hear the colonists wanting to fight like "savages," not like British regulars.
The Americans understood that it was in their best interest to secure the favor of the
Indians. The French had already managed to align themselves with northern tribes such as
the Delawares, but the powerful southern tribes were leaning towards the British.
Washington, Dinwiddie, and others wanted to see to it that This opportunity was not lost,
for, as Washington told the governor, "upon them much depends."31

29PGW. 2: 213.
3QPGW 2: 114-15 (Oct. 15, 1755).
31PGW: 3. 397 (Sept. 8, 1756).

II. COURTING THE INDIANS

The task of winning the loyalty of the southern Indians, particularly the Cherokees and
Catawbas, fell to William Byrd III and Peter Randolph. Both men were members o f the
Royal Council o f Virginia and both met the requirements set out by Washington and
Adam Stephen: they were well respected and they could be trusted. Their job was to
make a treaty with the Cherokees and Catawbas to insure that they would enter the field
with the British. Byrd’s reputation and family history helped him land this job. His father
and grandfather were known to have worked with the Indians o f the southern colonies,
and it was believed that this incarnation o f the William Byrd name also knew much about
these tribes. Although he was also well known for gambling and spending freely, William
Byrd III would prove to be a good choice for Dinwiddie.1
Peter Randolph also came from a long line o f public servants. Bom in 1713 to William
and Elizabeth Randplph, Peter haled from "Chatsworth" in Henrico County. He had been
appointed to the Council at the age o f thirty-eight. An uncle o f Jefferson's, he had made a
name for himself for being reliable and level-headed. He had married Lucy Bolling o f
Prince George County, and one o f their children, Beverley, would go on to become
governor o f the state o f Virginia.2
Byrd and Randolph had worked together on the Council in the past, serving on the
same committees. Although the call to bring about a peace with the Cherokees and
Catawbas was the most important task the two men had been given, their other jobs
suggest that they held the trust o f thejr fellow councilmen. Randolph had been placed on a

1The Correspondence o f The Three William Byrds o f Westover, Virginia, 1684-1776,
ed. Marion Tinling, 2 vols. (Charlottesville: University Press o f Virginia, 1977), 2:
603-4.
2"A Treaty Held with the Catawba and Cherokee Indians at the Catawba-Town and Broad
River, in the Months of February and March 1756," Virginia Magazine o f History and
Biography. 13 (Jan. 1906), 235.
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committee in February 1752 in charge of clearing out the Appomattox and Pamunkey
rivers, both of which had become "useless to the inhabitants o f this colony, by means of
mill-dams, fish-hedges, and other obstructions therein." Randolph was one of a group of
men expected tp contract o u t the job of getting the debris out of the rivers and making
them useful again fo the people o f Virginia.3 Randolph and Byrd were each named as
trustees for the towns o f Richmond and Falmouth by their peers. Among other
responsibilities, they were expected to "regulate the streets, and... settle the boundsof the
lots in the said town" and to ease the "inconveniences" o f the inhabitants.4
On December 23, 1755, Dinwiddie sent the two men out on business far more serious
to the survival o f the colonies. They were to proceed to the Catawba Nation and deliver
two speeches written by the governor. Alongwith the speeches, they received
instructions on how to deal with the Indians. The commissioners were to take all
necessary steps to convince the Indians o f the love and esteem that the British people and
American colonists had for them. All power was invested in these two men to conclude
treaties with the Indian nations.
Upon receiving their papers, Byrd and Randolph began their journey into Indian
country. It had been decided that they would negotiate with the Catawbas first, leaving
themselves more time to deliberate with the more numerous and powerful Cherokees.
The Catawba villages were located about 250 miles to the northwest o f Charles Town
(present-day Charleston, South Carolina), Whites had been trading with these Indians
since the late seventeenth century.5 The commissioners arrived at Catawba Town around
February 20, 1756.

3William Waller Hening, ed., The Statutes at Large; Being a Collection o f all the Laws o f
Virginia, From the First Session o f the Legislature, in the Year 1619 (reprinted
Charlottesville: University Press o f Virginia; 1969), 2:291.
4Hening, Statutes, 2:281.
5James H. Merrell, The Catawbas (New York: Chelsea House, 1989), 15.
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Along with their secretary, Thomas Adams of Henrico County, Byrd and Randolph
were met by "King Hagler" and Catawba warriors and sachems. William Giles served as
their interpreter. Hagler, or N opkecheashe was also known among his people, had been
dubbed a king by the whites. His own people knew him as their eractasswa.6 Unlike the
splintered leadership o f his Cherokee neighbors, Hauler exercised a dominance over his
people that was rarely seen among the southern Indians. A dedicated and proven friend of
the English, Hagler had solidified his position among his own people by always wringing
the most lucrative possible terms out o f the whites. He had become the chief o f the
Catawba in 1750 and would remain in that position until his death at the hands o f a
Shawnee war party thirteen years later. He had traveled extensively in the southern
colonies and was known to Indian and white power-brokers alike.7 The first order o f
business for the commissioners was to assure this powerful man o f their authority to do
business with him. To this end they opened the conference by reading their commission
from Governor Dinwiddie. This commission nearly guaranteed that Byrd and Randolph
would at least get a fair hearing. A military commission bearing the colonial seal and the
signature o f the governor carried great prestige among the Catawbas. In fact, North
Carolina governor Arthur Dobbs observed that a member o f the Catawbas carrying one o f
these official documents received "a distinction in his Nation" that could propel him to
political power.8 Armed with this powerful and symbolic paper, the commissioners
proceeded to read the message from the governor himself describing the atrocities
committed by the French and their Indian allies and laying out the desire o f the British to
have the Catawbas join with them in avenging these acts. Dinwiddie reminded the
Catawbas that the Six Nations had already taken up the British cause with great success,
6James H. Merrell, The Indians' New World: Catawbas and Their Neighbors from
European Contact through The Era o f Removal (Chapel Hill: University o f North
Carolina Press, 1989), 151.
7Merrell, The C ataw bas51.
8Merrell, The Indians'N ew World, 150.
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referring to the battle of Lake George in September 1755, when,the British and warriors
from the Six Nations bad soundly defeated the French.9
After reading this speech, the commissioners rose to speak their own minds. Byrd and
Randolph went considerably further than did Dinwiddie in their denunciations o f the
French. They probably agreed with the assessment of Edmond Atkin, a former member of
the South Carolina assembly, who had said that,inw ar, the Catawbas were "inferior [to]
no Indians whatever."10 Thejenemy, they assured the Catawbas, would rest only after
they had conquered the entire world and brought it under the French monarchy. They
were a people of "boundless Ambition," and their victory over the British would mean the
certain destruction o f the Catawba Nation as well.11 The Indians who had aligned
themselves with these devils were also in direct violation o f a treaty made with the English
at Logg's Town three years earlier and were therefore clearly the enemy of the Catawbas,
who had diligently adhered to that treaty. Finally, the commissioners bestowed their gifts
on King Hagler and his people—belts o f wampum and promises of arms.
When Byrd and Randolph had completed their sales pitch, Hagler rose. To insure that
there had been no mistakes, he repeated what he saw as the important parts o f what he
had been told. None o f the deferential tone associated with the language used by Indians
towards white men was likely evident in this speech. Hagler understood that the war
between the Europeans had given his people extraordinary bargaining power. Historian
James H. Merrell wrote that by the time the Seven Years' War exploded on the North
American continent, the leaders o f the Catawba nation "delivered....'strong' speeches, in
which Indians were not afraid to approach the limits of polite discourse in order to get
their point across."12 After driving his point home with the colonial representatives

9VMHB. 13 (Jan. 1906), "A Treaty Held with the Catawba and Cherokee Indians," 235.
10Merrell, The Indians' New World, 119
11VMHBJ 13 (Jan. 1906), "A Treaty Held with the Catawba and Cherokee Indians," 239.
12Merrell, The Indians'N ew World, 162.
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Hagler retired with his chiefs, promising the English emissaries an answer the next
morning.
On the morning o f Februaiy 21, Byrd and Randolph were summoned before Hagler
and the Catawba council. Hagler spoke first, directing his comments towards the treaty
that Byrd and Randolph had mentioned the previous day. The Shawnees and Delawares
had broken "the Chain o f Friendship" between Indians and the English, and Hagler vowed
not to rest until "we have sufficiently revenged the Blood o f our Friends."13 He called
upon the Cherokees to set the example for other southern tribes by also answering the call
of the British. Byrd and Randolph must have breathed a joint sigh of relief, for they could
not have scripted a more resounding answer.
King Hagler's answer was followed by eloquent and emotional statements of loyalty
from the warriors at the meeting. One by one, many of the warriors stood and declared
their loyalty to the British cause. The warrior Chippapaw summed up the feelings o f the
nation with his simple response to the English request. "You have put a bright Hatchet in
our Hands," he said, "which we have accepted and hold fast. You have also directed us
where to strike i t I am determined, either to dye it in the Blood o f our Enemies, or to
lose my Life in the Attempt."14 Now if was on to the Cherokee Nation^ where the
commissioners understood there was much more at stake.
Getting the Cherokees to sign a treaty promising to send their young men into battle
with British and American troops would not be nearly as easy as had been making the
treaty with the Catawbas. The Cherokees were already involved in the fighting between
the two European powers. In December 1755 Dinwiddie had written Washington to
inform him that the nation had sent 130 warriors to New River, where they were to meet
with British regulars and militiamen to proceed to the Ohio Valley. Here they were to

13VMHB, 13 (Jan. 1906}, "A Treaty Held with the Catawba and Cherokee Indians," 241.
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engage and destroy the Shawnees. The command o f this campaign had fallen to Andrew
Lewis, an experienced military man who had served as,a major in Washington's failure at
Fort Necessity and had been present when Braddock fell.15
Ironically, just as Byrd and Randolph were arriving in the Cherokee Nation to solicit
support, the Sandy Creek Expedition^ as it came to be called, was falling apart. When
Lewis's force reached the headwaters o f Sandy Creek, they began to struggle. For two
weeks after arriving at the creek, the army vainly tried to follow it to the Ohio River. As
supplies ran low, the rangers' commitment to the campaign faded. Finally, they simply
refused to go forward, forcing Lewis and the Cherokees to turn back.
The significance o f this expedition, at least at the time of the negotiations between the
commissioners and the Cherokees, lay not in its failure. The important fact on March 14,
1756 was that the Cherokees had already sent away 130 of their warriors. The primary
concern for the Cherokees, as the British would soon learn, was national security.
Protocol for the summit with the Cherokee leadership was much the same as it had
been with the Catawbas. Byrd and Randolph again began by assuring the Indians that they
were indeed authorized to make a treaty, and they then proceeded to read Governor
Dinwiddie's speech to them. Dinwiddie's attacks on the French were more pointed in the
speech to the Cherokees than they had been to the Catawba. He had been informed that
the French were trying desperately to gain the allegiance o f this nation, and he understood
the gravity of allowing this to occur. He warned the Cherokees that the French would
make every effort tp alienate them from their English brothers and he urged them not to
succumb. Dinwiddie informed the Cherokees not to let the French build any forts within
their boundaries and to destroy those already there. As he had with the Catawbas,
Dinwiddie played his trump card: the inherent competition between the North American
tribes. He reminded the Cherokees that the Iroquois had already helped the British secure
t----------------
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a major victory against the French. Did not the Cherokee warriors want to do the same?
Playing on the rivalry between the Cherokee and Iroquois was an intuitive psychological
ploy by the whites.
The rivarly that existed between the Cherokee and the Iroquois predated the arrival of
the European in America. Cherokee is an Iroquoian language and "radically different from
Muskogean, the language spoken by most native people in the South."16 The language is
but one indication o f cultural ties between the two Indian nations. Cherokee delegates
meeting with colonjal officials in Philadelphia in the summer of 1758 referred to their
northern Indian neighbors as their "Eldest Brother," another indication of the familiarity
that existed between them.17 The Cherokee likely migrated south following warfare with
the Iroquois. This movement did not diminsh, however, the enmity between the two
groups. As late as the 1730s the Cherokees and Iroquois had been actively killing and
capturing each other in raids and ambushes along the Great Warriors' Path, a road
frequented by the Indian allies o f the British.18
Although men like Byrd and Randolph could and did skillfully exploit this rivalry,
the colonial governments understood clearly that it was in their best interest to put an end
to the fighting between the Indian nations. As historian Theda Perdue points out, the
overriding concern o f the British "was that the French would exploit these divisions in the
ranks of Britain's native allies or that the nations would become so weakened by their own
wars that they would not be able to help Britain in her conflicts."19 The Cherokee nation
provided a protective buffer zone between English settlements and French armies or their
Indian allies. Iroquois warriors were necessary for the coming campaigns to conquer the
Ohio River Valley. The British understood that warfare between these groups diminshed

16Perdue, "Cherokee Relations with the Iroquois," 136.
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their effectiveness in these two areas, both o f which were of vital importance to the
crown's war effort. Beginning in the late 1730s colonial agents began to exert great
pressure on the Indians to conclude a peace. As a result, in June o f 1742 and then again in
the spring o f 1757 Cherokee and Iroquois delegations affirmed their friendship for each
other and their loyalty to His Majesty's cause. This "peace," brought about as it was by
the strenuous efforts o f the whites, showed a fundamental misconception o f Indian culture
and government. The Cherokee and Iroquois leaders "had made a peace they could not
keep."20 In the years following the truce there continued to be bloodshed on both sides,
even if somewhat less than in previous years. And even this relative calm would crumble,
without much concern from the English, at the end o f the Seven Years' War. Still, a
relative truce was more advantageous to the British than no truce at all, if for no other
reason than it allowed men like Byrd and Randolph to take advantage o f the rivalry
without much risk o f inciting all out war between the Indians, They understood that any
movement by either nation to gain prestige among the English would certainly be watched
closely and almost certainly followed by the other.
William Byrd and Peter Randolph went about dealing with the Cherokees in much the
same way they had dealt with the Catawbas. They assured the Cherokees o f their fidelity
and friendship and fold the leaders they hoped their relationship would continue for as
long as there was a sun and a moon. The commissioners quickly let the Cherokees know
that they had Come bearing gifts and that more would follow if the Cherokees took up the
hatchet against the French. As they had done in their summit with the Catawbas, they
described the horrible murders being committed along the Ohio by the French, Delawares,
and Shawnees. The commissioners argued that it served the best interests o f the
Cherokees to join the British because the French had become infamous for their
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"encroaching upon the lands" of other people.21 It must have been all the Cherokees
could do to suppress knowing smiles.
The commissioners also raised the specter o f French relations with other Indian tribes.
They reminded the Cherokees that the French had virtually wiped out the Natchez and that
they had made the same efforts against the Chickasaws. Byrd and Randolph were
understandably silent about the English treatment o f the Powhatan chiefdom in the
previous century.
Finally, the commissioners had to defuse a controversy that threatened their success.
Richard Smith* a friend o f the Cherokees, had told the Indians that presents meant for
them had been left behind with the Catawbas. This was considered a serious insult by the
Cherokees. Byrd and Randolph assured the assembled Indians that none o f their gifts had
been left with the Catawbas and apologized for the scarcity of material goods they had
been able to bring \yith them on the journey. To appease their slightly miffed Cherokee
audience, they offered a deal. The Cherokees could send some of their children back with
the commissioners to Virginia, who would see to it that they were enrolled at the Indian
School o f William and Mary College, also known as the Brafferton.22
This offer says as much about what the whites wanted to do to the Indians as fo r them.
The purpose of any enrollment o f Indian students at the Brafferton was as much about
acculturating them as it was educating them. The Cherokees had, in fact, already tried
their hand at English education with decidedly poor results. Eight Cherokee boys had
been enrolled from 1753 to 1755. Those who did not "pass away....ran away."23 In 1756
Governor Robert Dinwiddie wrote to some o f the Cherokee headmen that the "Young
Men that came here for Education at our College did not like Confinement" and had "no
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Inclination to Learning, "24 One such student crossed the James River and trekked the
three hundred miles home on foot "whileliving on nuts and berries."25 The Cherokees
tactfully declined tp try again.
As King Hagler had done,a few weeks before, the Cherokee leader Attakullakulla rose
at the end o f the British presentation to repeat what he felt were the important aspects of
what had been said. Once certain that he understood the terms his people were being
offered, he told the commissioners that his council would deliberate and return their
answer as soon as possible. Just as the Catawbas had done, the Cherokees left the British
to wait through the winter night as the Indians debated the issue.
Both Byrd and Randolph had been told from the outset that attaining the support of the
Cherokees was the essential goal o f their mission. Their more lengthy speeches to the
Cherokee council also showed that they understood that the Cherokees would be more
difficult to persuade than the Catawbas had been and they were not wrong. Unlike their
neighbors, the Cherokees did not return an answer the next day. Instead, the council
debated the proposal through the night of the thirteenth and all day the fourteenth. When
the British met again with the leaders o f the nation, they did not find the resounding
support that had characterized their second meeting with the Catawbas.
Attakullakulla spoke to the British from the standpoint o f a leader concerned for his
own people. Stories of murder and terror among the English did not particularly move the
Indian emperor. His people, he argued, were just as vulnerable to the attacks o f the rival
Indians as were any English settlement. He could not in good conscience send his men
away to protect the English if it meant leaving the women and children of his nation
exposed to the Frepch and their allies. As the English had done, Attakullakulla brought up
a treaty that had been made earlier between the Cherokees and the British. Governor Glen
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o f South Carolina had agreed to build a fort in Cherokee country, in return for which the
Cherokees had signed a release o f some o f their lands to the king o f England. The fort
had never been built and, when it came to the likelihood that the governor would actually
do so, the Cherokee leader bluntly stated, "we don't much rely on him."26 Attakullakulla
assured the commissioners that his people were ready and willing to g o with their armies
into battle, but not until they could be certain their families were secure.
Attakullakulla and the Cherokees could also appreciate the irony o f the governor o f
Virginia sending ambassadors to convince the Indians that his colony loved them when
Virginia still refused to make any trade agreement with the nation. The Cherokee leader
asked Dinwiddie's representative to look around at his people, specifically at their
"nakedness." The Cherokee emperor reminded his guests that their king had promised to
see to all o f the Cherokees' needs. The evidence in front o f them, however, clearly
showed this to be another promise that had not been kept. If Cherokee men were to fight
with the British, it was expected that the British would provide for them fully. Those
were the terms and once they were stated the Cherokees left Byrd and Randolph to decide
how best to answer them.
The next day—March 16, 1756—Byrd and Randolph again went before the Cherokee
leaders. The two men told the Cherokees that the speeches they had heard the day before
had reminded them that there were obligations to be met by both sides and that the British
had not been meeting theirs. The commissioner admitted that they had not considered
Cherokee villages to be in immediate danger from the enemy and that this had been an
oversight on their part. Importantly, Byrd and Randolph promised that the colony of
Virginia would do its part to see that a protective fort was built in Cherokee country to
insure the safety o f the Indians while their warriors were fighting for the British crown.
Finally, Byrd and Randolph hoped that another meeting would not be necessary but that
!
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the treaty could now be concluded. Attakullakulla told them that they would receive their
answer the next day.27
On the seventeenth, the Cherokees again came together with Byrd and Randolph.
They had discussed the British response to their requests and they were ready with a
response. They would send at least four hundred o f their warriors to assist the British,
and Attakullakulla believed he could eventually send twice that number. This would all be
done after the fo rt was completed. Byrd and Randolph agreed and the treaty was quickly
signed. The group then drank to each other's health and prosperity and the Indians
returned to their camp.28
In April 1756, upon hearing o f the successful treaty negotiations with the Cherokees,
Governor Dinwiddie dispatched a message to the Virginia House o f Burgesses to procure
the funds for building the Cherokee fort. The Virginia legislature lost no time in agreeing
with the provisions stipulated by the treaty and resolved that the fort would be built
immediately, using funds available to the governor from the British king. Dinwiddie then
moved quickly to purchase the materials needed for construction and supplies for the men
who would be assigned to garrison the fort.29 He wrote to Governor Dobbs o f North
Carolina to let him know that the fort would be under construction quickly because "if not
built this summer tbey [the Cherokees] will join the French." He also complained to his
friend that over a year earlier he had "sent Governor Glen...near 1000 [pounds] Sterling
towards the building" p f just such a fort, but Glen had made no efforts to begin it.30
Dinwiddie placed Andrew Lewis in chaige of overseeing the construction. Lewis, who
had just returned ffprn the failed Sandy Creek expedition, was one o f the most respected
Virginians o f the day, and his appointment shows the importance the colony was placing
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on getting the Cherokees into the field with Washington and others. Lewis left on April
24, 1756 to enlist men capable of helping with the construction. He had been ordered to
get sixty men and to lead them immediately into Cherokee country. Upon his arrival, he
was to confer with the Cherokee chiefs to learn where they wanted the fort to stand. He
was also to convince the Cherokees to lend his men some of their youths to assist in the
labor. By the end o f August, the fort had been completed and Dinwiddie wrote that it met
with the approval o f the. Cherokees. Once completed, the building was named Fort
Loudon, after the commander-in-chief of the British forces in North America.31 In
October 1756, the Virginia Assembly appropriated two thousand pounds for garrisoning
the fort with royal subjects and provisions.
The completion of Fort Loudon among the Cherokees secured the treaty that Byrd and
Randolph had made with the Indians. The affections of the most powerful and influential
o f the southern tribes had now been secured, no doubt to the great relief o f Washington
and the other British leaders. But the challenge was only beginning. The British
understood that the Indians tired o f causes quickly. Now that Indians were behind the
crown, the British had to find ways to keep them happy. There was also the difficulty of
living up to the treaties. The English would have to find ways to provide for their Indian
troops as the agreement called for. But in late 1756 the British were finding it increasingly
difficult to provide for their own armies. Clothing and arming their Indian allies would be
no less difficult, and it had to be done without alienating the American militia, a group that
had already shown itself to be less than dependable.
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JQBi Braddock's Ghost

John Forbes's men affectionately referred to him as "the Head o f Iron" and he was
worthy o f the distinction.1 Forbes was a proven soldier, known for his tenacity and
intelligence. He was capable o f both inspiring and intimidating as the situation dictated,
and he was exactly the kind of man the English needed as 1758 opened. Legend had it
that the general's life had been saved at the battle o f Culloden in 1746 by a farthing, a
small coin that had impeded the progress of the bullet that had been meant for his breast.2
He had risen by determination and skillful networking to the rank o f lieutenant-colonel by
1750, had fought ip the war o f the Austrian Succession, had served as the aide-de-camp o f
high-ranking English officials, and had helped thwart Charles Stuart's ill-fated attempt to
regain the English throne.3 He was no stranger to war or to the death that surrounded it.
Despite his nickname, John Forbes was a distinguished looking soldier. His portrait
reveals a man with a quiet, unassuming confidence. He had a rounded face, with gentle,
piercing eyes; his broad nose and pursed lips show a man of almost feminine good looks,
but his stare betrays an intensity that only men tainted with the blood of old enemies
exhibit. His genteel, distinctively English appearance must have spawned a few jokes
among the backwoodsmen and frontier men he was asked to turn into soldiers and to mold
into an army.
Forbes was appointed a colonel in the 17th Foot regiment o f the British army in early
1757 and he arrived in the American colonies with Lord Loudon, the new commander-in-
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chief o f the British forces in North America, shortly thereafter.4 His first year o f action in
the American theatre was a study in frustration for Forbes and the men he commanded.
The year 1757 seemed to follow the course set by Braddock with his tragic expedition
against the French. Time and again, the English found themselves repelled and
embarrassed by their European and Indian rivals. Early on, the English failed in their
attempt to wrestle Louisbourg away from the French and this failure meant that the French
held on to the St. Lawrence River and its surrounding area. Without this essential piece of
real estate, British officials felt that it would prove nearly impossible to eventually attack
the capital of Quebec. By year's end, the British had also lost Fort Oswego on Lake
Ontario and Forts George and William Henry on Lake Champlain. The French were
firmly in control o f the Ohio Valley and its outlying areas, and the British had been
demoralized by many defeats and setbacks.
The success of William Byrd III and Peter Randolph in mid-1756 had quickly been
overshadowed by these military failures. The pact with the Cherokees and Catawbas had
meant that the British would not be faced with a second, southern front. This assurance,
however, was not as comforting to professional British soldiers like Forbes, Henry
Bouquet, and Loudon as it was to the Americans living in and around southern Indian
country.

These men saw the conflict on the North American continent in terms foreign

to the colonists. The soldiers were well aware that the mother country was also trying to
stave off the French threat in India and that North America* though important* was only
part o f the larger equation.5 The Seven Years' War was, in reality, a world war. The
professional men in His Majesty's service understood the conflict in the context o f the
other wars that had ripped through the European continent. Beginning with King
William's War in 1689 and continuing through Queen Anne's War, which divided Europe
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from 1702 to 1713, the latest trouble was only the latest chapter in the continuing saga of
the English and French efforts to keep each other from achieving world dominance. As a
prelude to the war, George Washington had been dispatched by Governor Dinwiddie to
warn the French that they were encroaching on lands claimed by the English. Once the
war began, however, the goal was no longer to drive the French off these lands; instead, it
was a matter o f driving the French off the continent. In the eyes o f the British, anything
less would only serye to postpone yet another bloody conflict in the future.
The outcome o f the encounters o f 1757 certainly left the impression that the French
would be the ones to remain in North America. Lord Loudon had been less than
successful as a commander and the results had been disastrous. Historian William Sloane
wrote that Loudon was "fertile in inventions and busy with plans which never left the
paper they were sketched on."6 Loudon’s tentative nature had cost his nation greatly. As
1758 neared, French forces controlled five-sixths o f the North American continent east of
the Mississippi, and the British were securely in control o f less than half o f the remaining
areas. Moreover, the French controlled the Mississippi and St. Lawrence rivers, as well as
nearly every watervyay in between. Calling for the British government to step in and
impose greater controls on the people in America, Loudon blamed the colonies
themselves for his failures. Loudon went so far as to call for a Stamp Act on the colonies,
claiming that this was the only way to insure they would share responsibility for the war.
Sloane wrote that it "seems impossible to explain the imbecility o f the Englishmen then in
America."7
Thomas Gage, one of the British officers attending the war, wrote to George
Washington in Octpber 1757 to inform the Virginian that the "same Fatality that has, since
my Memory, attended all our Expeditions, attended that of this summer to the Northward"
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and that a "very considerable regular Force is now in these^parts [Albany, New York], but
what They w ill be employed in, is more by far, than I can inform you. "8 The disgust and
uncertainty for the British command that runs through the letter is an obvious sign that the
war was not going the way the English had hoped that it would. Loudon had intended to
attack the French from Nova Scotia but the expedition failed. Loudon was also facing
criticism from Gage and others because he, like John Forbes and General Abercromby,
was o f Scottish descent. His English subordinates felt that preference was given to lesser
qualified Scots whep it came time for promotions, and they quickly formed alliances
against the already troubled commander.
Loudon knew that his situation in America was precarious. His relationship with the
home government was strained and he had no victories to solidify his command. With this
in mind, he planned a campaign against Fort Ticonderoga in the winter o f 1757. As Gage
said in his letter to Washington, this campaign met with the same disastrous fate as so
many others. The actual plan for the campaign was not even completed until early 1758,
by which time Loudon's fate had been sealed. But not even this campaign would have
bolstered Loudon's reputation, because a heavy snow fell on the troops at Fort Edward
and with no snowshoes the troops were unable to take the field. Another winter had set in
on the hapless British and again the commander had failed to attack either Montreal or
Quebec.9 The mounting failures were more than the home government could stomach.
Lord Loudon's time was up.
"I am with Concern to acquaint Your Lordship, that the King has judged proper, that
your Lordship should return to England: And His Majesty having been pleased to appoint
Major General Abercromby to succeed your Lordship as Commander in Chief o f the
King's forces in America,'' Secretary o f State William Pitt wrote Loudon from Whitehall
!----------------
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on December 30, 1757.10 In other words, Lord Loudon had failed and Pitt was giving
him no more chances. The same day, Pitt dispatched orders to Abercromby,placing him
in charge o f the North American forces because o f his "zeal" and "abilities."11
Abercromby had not been Pitt's first choice for the job, but the prominence o f his rank
made it impossible for him to be overlooked. This may be the reason for Pitt's mention of
"zeal;" there would be no more tolerance for the tentative maneuvering that had
characterized Loudon's tenure. Moreover, Pitt wrote to six northern governors to assure
them that the change was made because the king, "having nothing more at Heart, than to
repair the Losses anjd Disappointments, o f the last inactive, and unhappy Campaign," was
determined to "avertsby the Blessing of God on His Arms, the Dangers impending in
North America."12 Pitt's change was significant because it legitimized "the opposition of
colonial assemblies to the prerogative as represented by the commander-in-chief' and
insured that the colonies would be reimbursed for all their expenses by the home
government.13 The shake-up went farther than the top position o f command. Wolfe and
Amherst were sent against Louisbourg, and Pitt had effectively flexed his muscle so that
Abercromby knew better than to try to bypass the Secretary in making out his strategies.
The old school o f officers had failed and been "shelved" by Pitt. One of the few who
survived the massive changes o f late 1757 was John Forbes.14
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As 1757 dragged on, the warriors o f the Cherokee nation often must have felt that they
had signed on with the wrong side. This must have caused some nervous moments for the
Indians, who knew that their entire way o f life could be destroyed through an alliance with
the wrong European power. The British seemed unable to put together any military plan
that met with success, and the Cherokees were constantly frustrated in their attempts to
aid the whites. In April 1757, the Virginia legislature passed a resolution that forbade the
Indians from being armed during muster. The warriors who had been so diligently
pursued by the likes o f Washington and Dinwiddie were instead relegated to being
employed as ''drummers, trumpeters, or pioneers, or in such other servile labor as they
shall be directed to perform." To add to this insult, the proud Cherokees were clumped
together with "free mulattoes" and "negroes" in this distinction.15 Cherokee warriors had
been committed to taking up the hatchet against the French and their Indians; they had left
their homes to assist the British in wiping out the French presence on their continent, not
to be part o f a drum and bugle corps for the British army.
The Indians who were fortunate enough to be included in the military plans of the
English were no happier. Arriving at British outposts was usually a disappointment for the
Indians. White settlers were highly unlikely to assist the Cherokees or other Indian groups
as they marched to the side o f the British armies, and when they arrived they were tired,
ragged, and usually in desperate need o f supplies. The British, however, were finding it
increasingly difficult to provide for the regulars, and the Indians fared no better.
Washington wrote to Robert Dinwiddie in late 1757 that the Indians seemed "to have a
natural strong attachment to our interest" but that the treatment they were receiving
endangered this bond. He went on to say that "the chief o f the Cherokee party... was so
incensed against what he imagined neglect and contempt, that, had we not supplied him
with a few necessaries, without which he could not go to war, he threatened to return,
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fired with resentment, to his nation.”16 Washington was very clear in this document about
what the Indians were demanding. The Cherokees were not expecting gratuitous gifts or
luxury items. These warriors were incensed because they had not been provided with
materials without which they "could not got to war" such as firearms.
Cherokees not only were not met with gifts or fanfare, but they often found themselves
rebuked for arriving when they did. Forbes dubbed the Cherokees "bad Judges of time"
who had "not the patience to wait our time."17 Timing annoyed the Cherokee warriors for
more reasons than just the lack of gifts and supplies. The Cherokees did not understand
the British unwillingness to act, to attack their enemies. It was against the very nature of
the Indian troops to sit around camp and wait for orders. Forbes, Washington, and
Colonel Henry Bouquet all bemoaned the impatience of their Indians. William Pitt and the
Indians could no doubt have had long conversations about the "timidity" of English forces.
The removal o f Lord Loudon raised the hopes of the colonists and the English back
home. John Forbes was placed in charge of the southern forces, and Colonel Henry
Bouquet began to assert himself as a soldier. Abercromby understood that the Ohio
Valley had to be ripped from the hands o f the French, for that area would be the launching
point for the attacks on French-Canadian territory. Forbes began to formulate his plans
for taking Fort Duquesne, a plan for which he needed Indians. The ghost of Edward
Braddock had to be exorcised, and 1758 was the year to do it. The English, the
Americans, and the Indians were about to get their war.
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IV, INTO THE FIELD

Colonel Henry Bouquet had become the most trusted advisor to the ailing but
determined John Forbes. Bouquet was o f Swiss descent and he saw himself as a soldier of
fortune. Forbes placed many o f the important details for the crucial expedition against
Fort Duquesne in Bouquet's hands, and Bouquet saw to it that the British troops would
not be thwarted while under his care. It was Bouquet who carved out Forbes Road, the
alternate route into western Pennsylvania that allowed the British to sneak into the
backyard o f the French. It was Bouquet's attention to detail and precision that allowed the
British to defeat the French at Duquesne, and in a very real sense it was Bouquet's success
that shook the foundation o f trust the English had cultivated with the Cherokee nation.1
Henry Bouquet led the Royal American Regiment, also called the 60th. The 60th was
the only regiment o f British regulars in which a foreigner could hold a commission. The
regiment was raised through recruitment o f Pennsylvania settlers, largely o f German
descent, and the officer corps was largely Swiss and German.2 Bouquet understood the
pressing importance o f his duties. William Pitt was determined to establish himself as the
power back in London and the best way for him to achieve this was to defeat the French.
Pitt had not only signed off on the expedition against the enemy in Pennsylvania but he
had ordered it, personally placing General Forbes in charge. If Bouquet were to fail,
Forbes would fail, and that failure could in turn mean the end o f Britain's hopes in the
Ohio Valley. Amid the difficulties o f overseeing the operation against Fort Duquesne,
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Bouquet also found himself trying to retain the services o f the Cherokee Indians at his
disposal.
The pressure on Bouquet came from all sides. Pitt wanted results, Forbes wanted
organization, the regulars and militiamen wanted Indians, and the Indians wanted action.
Knowing that the cause could ill afford another Braddockesque attack in the Ohio Valley,
Bouquet refused to move before he felt comfortable. Despite the infuriating impatience of
the Indians, toads andbridges had to be built; the Indians would simply have-to wait.
Still, his fellow officers were becoming wary o f the wait and the effects it could have on
their Indians. Captain William Trent, a Pennsylvania trader and speculator, wrote to
Bouquet on June 5 1758 to complain about "how 111 the Cherokees were used at
Carlisle. "3 He complained that the Cherokees came expecting a war and were used only
for occasional intelligence gathering. Two days later, Bouquet himself lamented to Forbes
the way the Indians were acting. "The Cherokees are behaving so badly," he wrote, "that
it seems they have made their decision, and are ready to leave us."4 The news seems to
have shaken the ailing Forbes. He was unusually grim in his letter to William Pitt dated
June 17, writing that "The Cherokees are, (I am afraid) no longer to be kept with us,
owing to their natural fickle disposition which is not to be got the better off by words nor
presents" and concluding "we shall lose the best part o f our strength as all the Northern
Indians mostly our enemies were kept in awe by the presence o f so many Cherokees. "5
The Cherokees, however, were uninterested in serving only as window dressing; the
northern tribes feared their southern rivals because o f their prowess on the battlefield, and
the Cherokees felt their prowess being wasted.
But Forbes's description o f the Cherokees' "fickle disposition" could not have been
more accurate. Every time the English were convinced that their Indians were packing
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and leaving, the Indians decided to stay. The Cherokees seemed determined that they
would not be taken for granted by their English benefactors. On June 8, eleven Cherokees
arrived at Fort Loudon. Despite an outbreak o f smallpox, Bouquet wrote to inform
General Forbes on June 16, "After two days o f intrigue, dinners, and public councils* the
Cherokees who were determined to leave us have changed their minds."6 Forbes must
have appreciated the Cherokees' obvious concern for his failing health. Bouquet
understood that the time for the campaign was drawing closer and he quickly moved to
solidify his support among the Cherokees and the Catawbas who were at his camp. This is
the speech he made to the troublesome Indians:
Brethren
A s long as we shall be united as one solid Stand we Shall chace our
Ennemys before us, as the w ind Mows the dry leaves o f the Trees, 1st us therefore Shut
our Ears to all bad Talks, Jalousies and disafation. We are your brothern and we have
a ll the Same Father the Great King, we w ill take care o f you, and supply you with every
thing we have, that can be o f service to you.
Let our friendship run forever as clear & Smooth as the Water o f the Ohio.
Some o f your People who called themselves Warriors have left us to go home, they
could Stay no longer without seeing the Wife. How w ill they dare to Shew their fa ces
before you in the great Council o f your Nation, after this sham efull retreat I am not
Sorry they are gone: We have strength Sufficient w thyour assistance to destroy the
French. They were come only to get Presents, but we are come to fig h t fo r our Liberty
and glory o f our Nations.7
Bouquet deftly played on all the major biases he had discovered during his experience
with the Cherokee people. Cherokees "who called themselves warriors" is a phrase that
surely struck at the very heart o f the Cherokees, who prided themselves on their bravery
and honor. By calling into question Indians' reputation as warriors, Bouquet essentially
called into question whether they could even call themselves Cherokee. In case his
audience missed the point, Bouquet continued to needle the Cherokees who had departed,
because they "could Stay no longer without seeing the Wife." If this barb didn't send
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snickers rippling through the Indian crowd, it must have at the very least made them
bristle. In any other situation, these would have been fighting words. Finally, Bouquet
assured the faithful that they would fight and triumph. "Liberty" and "glory" were words
the Cherokees could understand far more easily than "strategy" or "patience."
The speech must have been a resounding success because Bouquet wrote to Forbes on
June 16 that the Cherokees "resolved to follow us everywhere you may want to lead us.
They promised to follow the orders and directions o f the commander, and to conquer or
perish with us." In addition, Bouquet assured the general that he "was astonished to find
so much spirit, imagination, strength, and dignity in savages."8 Then, as if to prove their
worth, the chief of the Cherokee party had one of his warriors, recently returned from a
scouting mission near Fort Duquesne, trace out the road leading to the French base on the
ground with his knife. The intricacy o f the makeshift map is amazing to read about.
Bouquet wrote that the Indian included "all the rivers and roads which lead there, entering
into the smallest details on the nature o f the ground which is said to be mountainous
everywhere except along the Monongahela....He said that the polygon which faces the
river is still only a very high stockade, the land being very steep on that side. He was
obliged to climb into a tree to get a true idea of it. "9 This account alone makes it clear
why the British valued the Cherokees. Forbes wrote to Bouquet on June 16 to say
"Nothing can hinder us from proceeding but the defection of the Cherokees, bad roads,
[or] our Waggons."10 He had taken care of the Cherokees, and he was putting the
finishing touches on a road that would cut right through the heart o f French territory. The
momentum was shifting.
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By the end o f June 1758, Bouquet could brag to Forbes that "Our Indians are behaving
very well, scouting every day in the vicinity o f the camp, and I always have hunters in the
field."11 The Cherokees were assuming-the roles o f scouts, cooks, and medics for
Bouquet's army. The Indians hunted game daily to keep the troops fed and had saved a
Virginian's life after he was bitten by a rattlesnake. The Indians he had been
accompanying on a scouting trip gave him a root to chew and showed the soldier how to
wash the wound. At the time Bouquet wrote, the soldier "continued to chew the roots,
and he is almost cured."12 Cherokee scouts had also managed to kill and scalp a
Frenchman who was out hunting.
Yet Bouquet's letter to Forbes o f June 28 is important for another reason. He wrote
that he had sent Lieutenant Colby Chew, a "very alert young man" from George
Washington's regiment, out with a party o f Indians to gather some knowledge o f the
French strength at Fort Duquesne. Chew and the Indians were instructed to capture a
prisoner and to learn as much as they could about the enemy's forces. Chew and the
Indians arrived near Duquesne sometime in mid-August, and the cultural differences
between the whites and their Indian counterparts were never more obvious than on this
particular mission. The Indians demanded that the party stop about a mile before reaching
the fort to make "magic" and repaint their faces. After this prelude, the Indians insisted on
passing out "magic ^amulets" that would ward off enemy bullets before they would go any
closer to the fort. The Indians then stripped down "to breechclouts and moccasins [and]
they went on with their mission.
The Cherokees and the Catawbas were beginning to assert themselves as essential to
the British effort. £ orbes wrote to William Pitt on June 17, 1758 that he had "used every
art and Means to get intelligence o f the French and Indians (in their Alliance) in those
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parts [Fort Duquesne]." The "art and means" typically employed were similar to those
experienced by Colby Chew. Throughout the summer and early fall o f 1758, the English
sent out groups o f southern Indians, accompanied by several white soldiers, to reconnoiter
the French position. In mid-July, Washington wrote to Bouquet from his camp at Fort
Cumberland to inform him that he had sent out three intelligence-gathering parties. These
parties were made up o f a white officer and eighteen Cherokee scouts. Washington went
on to say that he believed "these Scalping Partys o f Indians we send out will more
effectually harass the Enemy (by keeping them under continuall alarams) than any Partys
o f white people cap do."14 Washington understood that Bouquet was having difficulty
with the Indians, but advised him that, "as I cannot conceive the best white men to be
equal to them in the woods," all attempts should be made to keep the Indians happy.15
Bouquet understood all too well the importance of the Indians to his cause, but that
did jiol make him care -any more for the Indians. His correspondence reveals a man
constantly frustrated by Indian threats to leave for home. Still, his letters also show the
importance o f these Indians to his mission. In early July, Bouquet himself had sent out a
party o f Cherokees to view the Ohio Valley and to evaluate French strength there. As did
all the English commanders, Bouquet made sure to send a white man along with the
Cherokees to insure the reporting o f the "truth."16 The Cherokees had also surprised the
Swiss commander by "working for us" and helping them to build a storehouse. Bouquet
wrote that this was an action which "I never heard of any Indian doing."17 In late July
another group o f Cherokee scouts returned to Bouquet with "a scalp and a French gun."
Bouquet immediately dispatched their report on the French position to General Forbes;
interestingly, he did so after confirming the report with only another Cherokee scout. 18
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The urgency with which Bouquet dispatched the Indians' report illustrates the credence the
English gave to the intelligence gathered by their Cherokee allies. Washington told
Bouquet in the summer of 1758 that he believed the troubles the English were having with
the Cherokees and other Indian groups were a result of their being "too sensible o f their
high importance to us. "19 Washington's assessment was not sarcastic; rather, it resulted
from his sincere belief that the Indians understood only too well how much the English
needed their eyes and stealth.
In early August, the first reports o f the French weakness at Fort Duquesne began to sift
into Bouquet's camp. Five Cherokees returned and reported that many o f the northern
Indians had abandoned the French, that there were no tents or troops around the fort, and
that the French no longer felt confident enough to venture beyond the walls o f Duquesne
after dark. Along Braddock's road there were fresh tracks neither o f human nor o f animal.
The French position had weakened, and the Cherokees were the first to bring the news to
the British. The time for attack was swiftly approaching.

By the late fall of 1758, Cherokee scouting parties had provided mounting evidence to
the British that the French hold on the Ohio Valley was tenuous. The summer had seen
Amherst, recently elevated over Abercromby to commander-in-chief o f the North
American forces, take the French post at Louisbourg with an ambitious attack coordinated
by land and sea. Now Fort Duquesne appeared to be within England's reach as well.
The Indians had provided the British with crucial intelligence, but the relationship
between the two had deteriorated throughout the summer months. The Cherokees were
in constant conflict with the Virginia frontier settlers, and South Carolina feared that the
conflict was going to boil over into an uprising o f the powerful Indian nation. Moreover,
Attakullakulla (Little Carpenter), arguably the most influential warrior, was demanding
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more gifts from Bouquet and Washington. The Cherokees were beginning to tire o f the
effort and were gradually leaving the British encampments. Still, those who remained
continued to bring in information that was critical to the march on Fort Duquesne.
By late November 1758, the English were knocking on the door of the French
stronghold in Pennsylvania. The daily drill was for the remaining Indians to deploy ahead
of Bouquet's forces in order to scout out the territory. After receiving word from these
scouts, Bouquet moved forward a little each day. John Forbes, "thoroughly ill and wornout," had decided on November 2 to proceed no farther than the Frenclibase at
Ligonier.20 That same night, however, the French had attacked and been repelled by
Forbes's army. A prisoner taken during this raid told the general that the French had lost
their Indian allies and that their position was weak. Forbes decided that the time for
resting would have to wait; he could not take a chance on the French regaining their
Indians or being reinforced. He pushed his army forward in conjunction with Bouquet and
Washington. On November 22, Forbes wrote to Bouquet: "I beg that the Indians be sent
forward to morrow for Intelligence, with orders to lye out all next night and watch any
force that the Ennemy may either send to attack us or bring to their fort."21 At this point,
historians have missed (or omitted) the importance o f the Indians' role in the taking o f Fort
Duquesne. From Bouquet's own hand it becomes apparent that it was Indian scouts who
first reported to him that Duquesne was his for the taking.
Historian Edward Hamilton wrote that on the night o f November 24 1758, British
troops "heard a great explosion as the French blew up their fort and abandoned the Forks
o f the Ohio."22 After hearing the explosion, the British supposedly moved quickly to Fort
Duquesne and discovered that the French had been forced to flee rather than face Forbes's
army. This account does not agree with what Bouquet wrote about that day. Bouquet
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wrote to William Allen on November 25 that "In the evening our Indians reported that
they had discovered a very thick smoak from the Front extending in the bottom along the
Ohio; a few hours after they sent word that the Enemies had abandoned their Fort after
having burnt everything. "23 Bouquet's account makes it clear that the Indians had been
sent ahead for the dangerous job o f sneaking around the French fort and gaining any
intelligence they could about the French. Bouquet's account also agrees with Forbes's
order to send the Indians ahead to scan the fort. Only after the Indian allies witnessed the
French retreat did the English march victoriously into the Ohio Valley.
Bouquet wasted no time in firing off letters to announce the "reduction" o f Fort
Duquesne and its symbolic transformation (at the behest o f General Forbes) into
Pittsburgh.24 On December 14, the Pennsylvania Gazette printed an excerpt from a letter
written in Pittsburgh giving credit to the Indian allies. "We were informed by one o f our
Indian Scouts... that it was burnt and abandoned by the Enemy... and the whole Army
followed."25 General Forbes proudly declared in that same edition that "the British Flag
flies over the Debris., i n Triumph. "26 The Ohio Valley was now His Majesty's property
and the French were reeling. On November 28, the army had marched proudly onto the
road where Braddock had lost his life. The war had come full circle. British soldiers
quietly buried the remains of some of Braddock's troops the French had left to the
elements. One major reportedly recognized the bodies o f his father and brother, locked in
a final embrace.27 The British and their Indians had regained the momentum and there
would be no stopping the British armies now that they were firmly in control o f the valley.
The alliance with the Cherokees, however, had suffered greatly. Most o f the Cherokees
had departed before the victory, and those who remained would forever be alienated by
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the treatment they received on their way back to Cherokee country. The British had won
the northern theatre, but the south was about to explode in a new and bloody episode.

V. FROM ALLY TO ENEMY

Bedford County, Virginia, has never held a particularly large place in histories o f the
Seven Years' War. The county, however, provides the historian with a small episode that
is indicative o f what went wrong between the Cherokees and the English jsettlers they had
been recruited to help. Even before Fort Duquesne was smoldering beneath the British
flag, the cracks that were always present beneath the surface o f the Anglo-Indian alliance
had begun to widen. Many Cherokees had done just what Bouquet alluded to in his
speech: they left the British to go home to their people. Along the trail leading to their
home, many o f these Cherokees were harassed by whites living in the area. Often hungry
and on foot, these warriors occasionally stole horses and cattle from the farmers and
settlers living in Virginia. The whites responded by killing the offending Indians. The
Cherokee code o f conduct, established long before the arrival o f the whites, dictated that
these deaths be avenged. The peace in the southern colonies was soon tom apart by these
misunderstandings between outraged whites and vengeful Cherokees.

In mid-May 1758 one o f the first instances o f Cherokee-white conflict on the Virginia
frontier occurred. William Callaway wrote irom Bedford to inform Colonel Washington
o f the troubles the Indians were experiencing. Callaway related the story o f a group of
Indians who had been fired upon after stealing horses from some settlers. These Indians
pulled men off their horses, stripped and whipped them, and then made off with the
animals. The Indians sometimes called themselves Cherokees and at other times called
themselves "Shonees."1 The exchange quickly became deadly, with one white man and

5:183
47

48

three Indians killed. The implications were clear to Washington and other members of the
British army: the southern Indians were rebelling.
William Byrd III was now commanding the Second Virginia Regiment under Lord
Loudon. He was also hearing the ugly rumors that were emanating from Bedford County.
Byrd fired off a series o f letters to General John Forbes trying to assure his superior that
the coalition he had so delicately put together would hold. Byrd had written to Forbes in
April of 1758 that he had heard that a party of nearly four hundred Cherokees was
prowling the Virginia countryside. He had sent out messengers to bring these Indians to
his camp for a meeting, but the messengers returned "without a single man. "2 The magic
that Byrd had performed in gaining the support o f the southern Indian tribes was not to be
replicated.
But the irrepressible Byrd was not finished. If the Indians who had already fled and
plundered in Bedford County were not to be coaxed back into the fold, then he felt it was
his responsibility to hold on to those still under his and Forbes's command. To this end, he
dispatched a message from the Indians (referred to as "my savages" by the commander)
accompanying him to the Indians in the northern theatre. Byrd explained to Forbes that
his reason for the urgent message was to prevent the Cherokees from becoming alarmed
and fleeing en masse, "the consequence o f which would bo the utter distraction o f this part
o f the country & an unavoidable warr with these people."3
The warriors responsible for the mischief in Bedford, whether Cherokee or not (and
the consensus quickly said that they were) did not represent the Cherokee nation. The
divisions between the whites and the Indians reflected the discord occurring back home for
the Indians. Many Cherokees were still scouting for Bouquet and Forbes, and many were
still loyal to the British cause. William Byrd sang the praises o f three o f his Cherokees as
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late as August 24, 1758, for returning from a scouting expedition with two scalps.4 The
consensus that Byrd had obtained in 1756, however, was now gone for good. More and
more Cherokees returned home with stories o f maltreatment at the hands o f the whites.
Many o f the Indians who returned to Cherokee country in the summer o f 1758 were not
the deserters o f whom Bouquet had spoken with such contempt. Many were simply
returning from having faithfully served the British as intelligence gatherers or warriors.
These Indians no doubt thought that the least the whites could do to show their
appreciation was to provide for them on their long journey homeward. The discontent
soon spread throughout the ranks, eventually leaving. Byrd to lament to his commanding
officer that "every one o f my cursed Indians has left me."5
Without the expected tribute from the farmers whose homes lay between the battlefield
and the Cherokee nation, the Indians turned to a practice that was a natural part of their
everyday life: raiding. In one instance following close on the heels o f the Bedford County
disturbance, whites at Rabl's Fort in South Carolina turned away an Indian raiding party.
The bodies o f the dead intruders were then cut up and fed to local dogs.6
The alliance also suffered as a result o f peace negotiations between Forbes and
northern tribes such as the Delaware. The Cherokees had understood the agreement to
call for the destruction o f both the French and their Indian allies; the peace overtures
between the English and these rival tribes must therefore have seemed treacherous to
them. Francis Halkett wrote to Washington from Philadelphia on May 4, 1758, to say that
"Thier is a Treaty on foot just now between the Shawanes, the Delawares, and the people
o f this province" and that he was "very sorry to learn, that several o f the Cherokees have
taken into their heads to ramble this way. "7 Halkett understood that the peace talks could
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potentially alienate the southern Indians, but he also understood that Forbes was
determined to forge ahead with the negotiations.
Such attempts to make peace with the northern tribes were troubling news to the men
garrisoning Fort Loudon in Cherokee country. The officers there immediately held a
council and passed a resolution, which they forwarded to their superiors. The resolution
said:
We considered that, The Cherokees are now firmly engaged by our means in a war
against the French & their Indians, & having received some small losses, have frequently
begged o f us not to think of making Peace till they as well as we are satisfied.
They are a jealous people, and-may probably say, when they hear as peace is proposed,
that we are about to do, what theyFrave trften told us they were afraid of, namely, that as
soon as they had firmly engaged; an d incensed many Nations, by their friendship for the
English, we should make peace and leave them to be destroyed.
The men at Loudon understood that these peace talks would only serve to exacerbate the
problems between the Cherokees and the British.8
The English and the Cherokees each made noble efforts to avert a war. Qnce the
blood had been shed, however, the cycle seemingly became self-perpetuating, and the
cooler heads on both sides were being overcome by calls to arms. The spring o f 1758
brought with it much violence, including one exchange where white settlers killed thirty
Cherokees. In April 1757, the Virginia legislature had passed a resolution paying hefty
rewards for Indian scalps. This same piece o f legislation also made it a felony to kill a
"friendly Indian*" but the Virginia lawmakers soon found it difficult to tell which scalps
belonged to what tribe 9 As a result the lawmakers were forced to repeal the law in the
summer o f 1758.
The campaign against Fort Duquesne had also served to weaken the bond between the
English and the Cherokees. Little Carpenter complained that Forbes had not supplied

8VMHB 19 (Jan. 1911}, 66.
9Hening, Statutes, 2:121-23.

51

them with "so much as...a little paint."10 As a result, the influential Cherokee leader had
abandoned the mission two days before the taking o f the fort, Forbes responded by
detaining and disarming the Cherokees who followed Little Carpenter. This action only
served to further anger the Indians. Although Little Carpenter worked diligently for peace
after the war, his voice was not heard by his fellow Cherokees. Little Carpenter had been
a delegate to the court o f King George II in 1730 and had perhaps been impressed with
the sheer number o f the king's subjects and with the ostentatious display o f wealth he and
the other Indians were shown.11 But for once his counsel was not heeded by his people.
The insults were mQunting in the minds o f the Cherokee people.
Back in Cherokee country, away from the front lines on the Virginia frontiers,
circumstances were no better. Carolina settlers were moving even farther onto Cherokee
hunting grounds, and there were rumors that soldiers from Fort Prince George had even
raped Cherokee women while the warriors were up north (putting an interesting twist on
Bouquet's mockery o f the native need to go home to see their wives).12 In the summer of
1759, only one year after the Cherokee scouts had played such a key part in helping the
British drive the French from the Ohio Valley, tensions quickly escalated. Cherokees
living in the Lower Towns o f their nation revolted against the English, an action that
culminated in theJdlling and scalping ofthree whites: a packhorse man, a soldier, and a
trader.13 The violence sent the settlers who had encroached upon Cherokee land?
scrambling for the shelter o f Fort Prince George and Fort Loudon. Several days later,
these same Cherokees, against the wishes of the Little Carpenter, showed up at Fort
Loudon demanding ammunition. When their demands were refused, they set up road

10P.M. Hamer, "Fort Loudon in the Cherokee War, 1758-1761," North Carolina
H istorical Review, 2 (1925): 443.
1]Duane H. King, Cherokee Heritage (Cherokee: Cherokee Communications, 1988), 96.
12Hamer, "Fort Loudon," 445.
13Ibid, 445.
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blocks on all the roads leading into the fort. Open warfare had not yet been declared by
either side, but the siege o f Fort Loudon had begun.
Fort Loudon stood near the present-day city of Knoxville, Tennessee. Early in the
war, the Cherokees had considered the fort a good buffer against Trench attempts at
vengeance and had induced artisans and other whites to move near the fort by offering
them gifts o f land.14 Lying some two hundred miles from the nearest South Carolina
outpost, the fort held little significance to the English other than as one of the stipulations
the Cherokees had made before they agreed to take up the hatchet against the French.
The siege o f the fort was a direct result o f the early skirmishes between whites and
Cherokees. As a result o f the murder o f whites along the Virginia frontier, in nearby
North Carolina counties, and in South Carolina itself, Governor William Henry Lyttelton
o f South Carolina had demanded that the Cherokees turn over the twenty-four Indians
suspected o f killing the settlers. Lyttelton, an English aristocrat with great ambition, did
not have the extensive network of intelligence that had been available to his predecessor
Glen. The new governor relied heavily on a few military advisors who answered to him
directly, ignoring "information from a broad network o f traders and shopkeepers
throughout western Carolina and the Cherokee country."15

Lyttleton wrote to William

Pitt on December 29, 1759, that he would like to pardon these Indians, as a show of
good-will to the Cherokee people.16 But Lyttelton failed to convey this to the Cherokee
people. Rather than wait for the twenty-four murderers to be brought in, he demanded
that an equal number o f Cherokee hostages be left at Fort Prince George to ensure
Cherokee compliance with the agreement. Historian P.M. Hamer wrote that this was

^ VMHB, 30: 89.
15Hatley, The D ividing Paths, 109.
16Kimball, Correspondence o f William Pitt, 230.
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viewed "as an apt o f aggression.. .even the Little Carpenter could not satisfactorily
explain."17
When the Little Carpenter heard the terms set out by Governor Lyttleton, "he had
wept, knowing that these men had acted by the basic law of family and clan and that he
must deliver them to death in order to bring peace."18 But he also had his own fortunes to
think about. The Little Carpenter understood the amount of political influence he would
risk by agreeing to Lyttleton's demands. The only course available to him to insure peace
was anathema to the Cherokee people. Neither o f the governor's requirements made any
sense to the majority of the tribe. They did not understand taking hostages who were not
involved in the crime. Nor did they understand accusing Cherokee warriors of murder in
an action that they felt was brought about by the increasing encroachment and aggression
o f white settlers.
The fate o f these Indian hostages seems to have been the final blow that took the
conflict from mere skirmishing to outright warfare. Soldiers attempted to place their
Cherokee prisoners in leg irons, a move the Indians resisted with violence. Taking up
knives and hatchets they had hidden away, the Indians managed to kill one soldier and
wound another. At this, the other soldiers pounced upon the Indians, killing all of them.19
When news o f this debacle reached the Cherokees in early 1760, the reaction was an allout cry for war. John Kelly, a trader near the Cherokee country, was one of the first to
feel their wrath. Kelly was killed and his body quartered, with his hands posted on stakes
near the Hiwassee townhouse to send a message to all whites in the area.20 Little
Carpenter, realizing that events were rapidly spiraling out of control, left for the woods

17Hamer, "Fort Loudon," 449.
18David Corkran, The Cherokee Frontier, 1740-62 (Norman: University o f Oklahoma
Press, 1962), 186.
19Hamer, "Fort Loudon," 450.
20Corkran, Cherokee Frontier, 191.
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with his family. He could not bear to watch what he believed would be the destruction of
his nation.
The soldiers at Fort Loudon were quickly running out o f provisions. The fort was
heavily armed, making it impossible for the Indians to take it by force, but without food
there was little the whites could do but wait. Henry Timberlake, a lieutenant in the army,
reported that many of the soldiers had food smuggled into them by their Cherokee wives,
but this practice was quickly discovered and ended.21 Major General Amherst, realizing
that the situation was grim, dispatched 1,300 men under the leadership of Col. Archibald
Montgomery to relieve the troops and to discipline the rebellious Cherokees.
Montgomery had hoped to engage the Cherokees with a force considerably larger than
the one he led into the field. But even with a significant raise in pay, militia recruitment
stalled. A backcountry observer noted that "I can find in my mind not one proper person
that I think will take Commission.”22 Montgomery even found traditional native enemies
of the Cherokees hesitant to join the campaign. The same observer who had noted the
lack o f passion among the whites noted that even the Catawbas had "no relish for going
against the Cherokee."23 On June 27, 1760, Montgomery, still miles away from Fort
Loudon, was turned back by a force o f Cherokee warriors. The British colonel lost
twenty men and had seventy more wounded. He was forced to return to Charleston, and
Fort Loudon was once again left on its own.24
Finally, on August 7, the fort surrendered to the Cherokees. The terms were simple:
the whites were to leave the fort to the Indians, who would in turn escort them safely to
Fort Prince George. On August 8, the Cherokees officially took over the garrison,

2Thom as H. Cook, "Old Fort Loudon, The First English Settlement in What is Now the
State o f Tennesse, and the Fort Loudon Massacre," Tennessee Historical Magazine,
7(1921), 111-133.
22Hatley, The Dividing Paths, 129.
23Ibid.
24Hamer, "Fort Loudon," 452.
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"moving their families into the barracks and officers’ houses."25 The Indians escorted the
whites for one day, taking them as far as Cane Creek, about fifteen miles from Loudon.
On the next day, August 10, however, the Cherokees attacked the whites, killing many
and taking the rest prisoner. Over the next several months, the Cherokees ransomed these
prisoners to the South Carolina government. Such was the event that became known as
the Fort Loudon massacre. The English were incensed at the treatment their men had
received at the hands o f the Cherokees and were determined to break the back of the
powerful southern tribe.
In 1761 Lieutenant James Grant was sent from New York with a battalion o f the 77th
to destroy the Cherokees; he ravaged the Lower Towns, which had been the primary
instigators o f the war, and then proceeded to plunder the Middle Towns.26 The
Cherokees were no match for the British who, with no French threat to speak o f anymore,
were able to concentrate their forces on the Indian nation. The Cherokees sued for peace
and the war came to an end.27

In 1756, the Cherokees had been the jewel in the crown o f the likes o f Robert
Dinwiddie, George Washington, and William Byrd III. The southern Indians were clearly
"a part o f the political landscape" mid "the colonists could not afford to undertake
diplomatic initiatives without at least a glance west."28 Despite wariness on the part of
professionals like John Forbes and Henry Bouquet, the Indians had proven themselves on
the battlefields o f North America. They had led the British to Fort Duquesne, and they
had bled and died beside white men.

25Ibid, 455.
26Corkran, The Cherokee Frontier, 207.
27Hamer, "Fort Loudon," 457.
28Hatley, The D ividing Paths, 27.
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Yet at the end o f 1761, they, like the French they had helped to defeat, were a defeated
nation. The Cherokee nation would not share in the victory o f the Seven Years' War,
although it was a victory they helped to forge. Instead, they would try to piece their own
lives back together.

The Cherokees had played a part in realigning the powers o f the

world, but they found themselves outsiders looking in on the new world order.
Unpredictable, often unreliable, and hopelessly divided, they had seen the might of colonial
militias and British regulars turned against their homes. Although only a few years before
George Washington had extoled the values of their fighting methods and William Byrd III
had begged for blankets to clothe his men "after the Indian fashion," they were now
merely dispensable savages. Most whites viewed the Indians as ungrateful and
treacherous. Had the natives not, they asked, turned their backs on their benefactors to
plunder the countryside, killing indiscriminately as they made their way back home?
In the end, however, it was not a matter o f the Indians being turncoats or the whites
being ungrateful. It was a cultural chasm that could not be bridged without a dialogue
that war and ethnocentrism on both sides rendered impossible. The Indians had little
tolerance for the pace o f the white man's warfare and the whites grew tired o f constantly
having to coax their allies to stay. Perhaps the bloody and tragic end was the logical
conclusion to what, at best, amounted to a tenuous and temporary partnership.
Still, we cannot make excuses for the exemption o f the Indian from the histories o f the
Seven Years' War. The Indian mode o f warfare that the British had once eschewed would
again be employed by the colonists, as it had been against the French, to toss another
European colonial power from the continent. Upon the natives, as George Washington
had said, much depended. This omission o f the American Indians from the histories o f the
Seven Years' War have inevitably led to an omission o f the Indians' role in the American
Revolution. Historian Colin G. Calloway notes that American histories have accorded
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"Indians a minimal and negative role in the story of the Revolution: they chose the wrong
side and they lost."29 Failure to document and discuss the importance of the American
Indian in the Seven Years' War has also led to the national fallacy that, in the intervening
years between Squanto and Sitting Bull, the Indians were but a shadowy presence on the
continent, ceding land and killing the occasional settler, without making any contribution
o f lasting value to .a developing nation. Calloway further points out that "white Americans
excluded Indians from the republican society the Revolution created."30 The first step in
rectifying this exclusion may be to rectify the history itself. This is a matter of simple,
overdue inclusion, not revision.
The loss o f a European rivalry upon which to play considerably narrowed the
maneuvering room for Indian leaders and people. They were now at the mercy o f the
whites' good intentions, of which there were precious few. The tenuous peace that had
existed between the Cherokees and the Iroquois exploded into all-out war shortly after the
conclusion of the Cherokee War, leaving the Cherokees further devastated. The British
had themselves destroyed "fifteen townsL and 14QQ acres of crops" and they were in no
mood to deny the Iroquois their own booty from their weakened southern brethren.31
Unlike before, the British placed no pressure on the two groups to stop the fighting. In
fact, this time it was the Cherokees who asked the British to help bring about peace with
the Iroquois. But colonial officials were in no mood to play mediator. As Theda Perdue
observes, "Now that the French had been defeated, the British could permit the Indians to
destroy each other. "32 Not only could they permit it, it was in their best national interest
to do so.

29Calloway, The American Revolution in Indian Country, xii.
30Ibid, xv.
3Perdue, "Cherokee Relations with the Iroquois," 143.
32Perdue, "Cherokee Relations with the Iroquois," 145.
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The cooperation o f the southern Indians had prevented the possibility o f a two-front
war for the English. It had given the English additional manpower. They had trained, by
example, their white counterparts in the art o f guerilla warfare. The Indians contributed to
the victory that contributed to their ultimate downfall as a political force on the continent
they called home. Henceforth their most powerful bargaining chip lay in their ability to
wage war against the more numerous and better armed white colonists. Diplomacy, like
Indian dreams o f parity, was gone.
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